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 COOPERATIVE SUPPLY CHAINS IN PEACE AND AT WAR
PER J. AGRELL AND KOSTAS KARANTININIS
Abstract. In the competition between supply chains, governance structure
and coordination mechanisms can be as important as cost-e¢ciency. Flex-
ible and non-committing contracts among upstream suppliers in cooperative
alliances may lead to lower chain surplus through internal competition and ren-
ders the coordinator￿s postition vulnerable for hostile take-overs. Cooperative
supply chains are found in e.g. food industry, banking services, law￿rms and
brokerage. The downstream processing or brand is owned collectively by the
suppliers or service-providers. The supplier are linked to the chain by strong
delivery (channel) rights and volume-based revenue-sharing schemes. The gov-
ernance is ￿exible, promotes entry and market expansion. However, the de-
centralized decision making comes at a cost in terms of chain performance and
resilience. A dynamic two-chain model with a captive and competitive market
addresses the particular situation where the a competing chain aggressor has
a cooperative governance structure. The overt aggression at merger may have
more to do with shortcomings in the managerial incentive structure than with
the pursuit of market power. The results from the dynamic game is illustrated
with empirical ￿ndings among dairy cooperatives in Denmark.
1. Introduction
The management literature often endorses the value of loose or informal alliances
to achieve supply network bene￿ts in terms of product and process innovation,
capacity provision and inventory pooling. The low threshold of entry and the low
commitment may indeed attract ￿rms and entrepreneurs that would balk at tighter
contractual agreements with potential competitors. However, the con￿icts between
such friendly alliances may be both more ￿erce and less rewarding for the winner
than alternative forms of governance. This paper is devoted to the competition
among cooperative supply chains, typically found in food industry, banking services
(credit cards), stock exchanges and law ￿rms.
Thetraditional cooperative organization (one-man, one-vote) has particular char-
acteristics when faced with imperfect markets, managerial incentives and industrial
structural development. Neoclassical studies of producer cooperatives have been
made by e.g. Sexton (1986). The joint ownership of a cooperative, without individ-
ual claim on the value of the ￿rm, has allegedly an e⁄ect to discourage investments
and retained earnings in favor of higher patronages. Many producer cooperatives
have a higher proportion of debt than comparable ￿rms in their industries and
lower investment ratios. The preference for immediate rewards naturally hampers
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the development of value-added products and durable brands. At the heart of this
problem is the decentralized decision making in the cooperative enterprises, where
each member freely chooses delivered volume. As volume maximization comes at
a high cost in terms of market gains in the commodity segment of the market, it
may be bene￿cial for the cooperative management to reduce the cooperative com-
petition. This observation puts our attention at the procedure for mergers among
producer cooperative under imperfect competition, in particular to the obstacles
for mergers and how/when they may be overcome.
Since the owners-producers have no right to individually sell the residual of their
e⁄orts, neither has the management of the cooperative. Assuming a certain man-
agerial utility for heading the ￿rm, such as in Williamson (1963), and considering
the cultural inertia to establish competitive packages for executives in cooperatives,
there are weak incentives for cooperative managers to induce mergers. As the infor-
mation ￿ow may be channeled through the current management to the members,
there is also reason to believe that the cooperation of the management is necessary
to e⁄ectively elicit support for a mutually bene￿cial merger. If such communication
can be made credibly and convincingly, the members of the less powerful coopera-
tive would in theory abandon their previous organization to voluntarily enter into
the merged organization, plausibly after some contractual grace period.
However, the members may also have rational reasons to remain in their current
organization, due to varying beliefs about managerial skills, production methods or
investment ratios. There may also be uncertainty about the brand value in captive
markets when the dominance becomes overwhelming. Examples may be organic
versus traditional producers that compete on a joint market. In any of these cases,
there are rational reasons and managerial incentives for ￿nancially dominating pro-
ducer cooperatives to initiate, promote, urge and, if necessary, force horizontal
integration. Given the low value-added of the output and the requirement to sell
all delivered input, a price-war is a highly e⁄ective means of persuasion. In order
to resist such aggression or to succeed in the endeavor, depending on which side
one is studying, the correct level of equity for the operating risk is of uttermost
importance.
This paper contributes to the literature by modeling the aggressive behavior by
dominant producer cooperative, showing the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the cooperative organization in presence of oligopoly with a competitive fringe. This
extends the industrial organization literature on producer cooperatives under im-
perfect competition. It also sheds some light on current topics related to regulation
of mergers among investor-owned and cooperative ￿rms in the food industry.
Next, we present a mathematical model to explain the temptation and strategy
behind the mergers, as well as giving a price on managerial independence. Finally,
we illustrate the model with the pre-merger behavior of the largest dairy producer
in Europe in 1999, MD Foods.COOPERATIVE SUPPLY CHAINS IN PEACE AND AT WAR 3
2. The Model
Two supply chains with identical processing cost, for simplicity called Leader and
Follower, produce and sell a homogenous product
1. Their processing cost functions
have constant marginal cost c,
C(Q) = cQ +K
where Q is the processed quantity, K is a ￿xed period cost. If the processing cost
would have been modelled using increasing marginal cost, no merger gains would
prevail and the cooperative model would suggest the formation of N processors. A
decreasing marginal cost also gives extreme solutions, as complete concentration is
the outcome. Thus, if mergers prevail in the industry without resorting to natural
monopolies, the linear structure with a ￿xed term is the most preferable. The
inputs are purchased from N identical suppliers, m thereof are delivering only to
Leader and the remaining n < m are delivering only to Follower. The entry barrier
corresponds to common cooperative contractual obligations with excessive transfer
periods, geographical and cultural barriers. Each supplier has a quadratic cost





Two markets are studied, a captive market (1) with ￿rms Leader and Follower as
the only providers of the good and one competitive market (2) with a given market
price p2 ‚ c, to which only Leader has access. The situation may correspond to two
di⁄erent state of brand recognition, market investment or, as in the illustration, a
result of a prior collusive agreement. The inverse demand function of the captive
market is given as
p(Q) = ﬁ ¡ﬂQ
where Q is the total milk supply and ﬁ;ﬂ are constants. Denote2 the supply
of Leader to the captive market by Q1 and the competitive quantity as Q2. Since
distribution of pro￿t is not the focus of the paper, the ￿rms may be seen as vertically
integrated under two di⁄erent control regimes. The single-period pro￿t functions for
Leader V (Q1;Q2) and Follower v(q); where q is the captive supply of the Follower
￿rm, may be formulated as










1Here the production analogy is followed, but in the case of services (such as credit cards), the
processing would correspond to joint marketing, settlement and administration of purchases. The
suppliers in this case would corresspond to the member banks and their cardholding clients.
2For the conveniency of the reader, the produced quantities, rents and other results for Leader
are denoted by upper case letters (Q;V ), and analogously lower case letters denote results for
Follower.4 PER J. AGRELL AND KOSTAS KARANTININIS
Regardless of control regime, investor-owned or cooperative, the larger ￿rm has
incentives to exploit monopoly rents by merging with the smaller. The particular
angle of the paper is the threat of aggression to force the smaller out of the market,
e.g., in case of a management refusal to accept the merger conditions or in the pres-
ence of merger law. In order to later compare the investor-owned control with the
cooperative organization, we will study the optimal aggression of a dominant IOF
towards a fringe IOF ￿rm. The approach is straight-forward: First the attainable
pro￿ts from duopoly (friendly coexistence) and monopoly are determined. Second,
a dynamic price-war game is formulated, solved and interpreted for the IOF case.
2.1. The IOF Duopoly Model. Firm Leader acts as leader in a von Stackelberg
duopoly model on the captive market, thus anticipating the reaction function of
￿rm Follower,





or, with the given price function for the captive market,
(2.3) q
⁄(Q1) =
nﬂ(ﬁ ¡ c ¡ ﬂQ1)
2nﬂ + w
:
The resulting single-period duopoly pro￿t for Leader is obtained as
(2.4) V ⁄ = max
Q1;Q2
(
V (Q1;Q2) = p(Q1 +q⁄(Q1))Q1





















n2ﬂ(ﬁ ¡ 3c +2p2) +w(ﬁ ¡ 2c +p2)
2(2nﬂ +w)(nﬂ + w)
: (2.7)
with the corresponding duopoly pro￿ts V ⁄ = V (Q⁄
1;Q⁄
2) and v⁄ = v (q⁄ (Q⁄
1))
(the expressions are fairly cumbersome and the details are given in Appendix 9.1),










;where – < 1 is a
discount factor.
2.2. The IOF Monopoly Model. If Follower and Leader merge, the market
structure turns to a monopoly. We additionally assume that all primary producers
join the merged entity, that consequently has N producers. The investor-owned
merged ￿rm solves problem (2.4) for the case q⁄(:) = 0 and obtains the monopoly
pro￿t
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Nﬂ(p2 ¡ c) ¡ w(ﬁ ¡p2)
2ﬂw
: (2.10)





;which of course exceeds
ƒ⁄ + …⁄:
3. The Price-War Game for IOF
The market power and the reduction of ￿xed cost and variable costs (through the
enrollment of more suppliers) motivate Leader to merge with Follower in the interest
of both owners. For the case of investor-owned ￿rms, this could be accomplished
either as an open bid or as a hostile take-over, in case management or some owners
would oppose the order of merger. However, the actual division of the gain ƒ⁄⁄ ¡
(ƒ⁄ + …⁄) would be a question of bargaining and is left out of this presentation.
Now assume that for some reason, either an aversion against voluntary merger
and/or the absence of a public stock-market (or any system of individual claims
on equity), the dominant ￿rm Leader is forced to wage a price-war against ￿rm
Follower to induce a merger. It is assumed that the production or service has to
be continuous to uphold the market power and that once stalled, substantial entry-
barriers would prohibit the reinstallation3. The length of the con￿ict is ultimately
bounded by the equity U and u of ￿rms Leader and Follower, respectively. The
most aggressive price-war under the mixed production case ﬁ¡p2 ‚ 0 and p2¡c ‚ 0



































The payo⁄s above form the basis for a dynamic price-war game under perfect
information played between the ￿rms. The fringe ￿rm Follower has the options to
resist take-over and to continue as price taker (Follow) or to accept the invitation
(Surrender): The dominant may choose to attack the fringe ￿rm by lowering the
price (Fight), to opt for status quo, the duopoly coexistence (Truce) or to exploit
the market rents from a merger (Monopoly):
3The assumption is reasonable in both process-industry settings and service provision (payment
operations, exchanges)..6 PER J. AGRELL AND KOSTAS KARANTININIS
Technically, Leader decides upon an action Ht 2 fFight;Truce;Monopolyg in
















ter the revelation of Ht, ￿rm Follower responds with an action ht 2 fFollow;Surrenderg,
corresponding to the quantities qt 2 fq⁄ (Q1);0g. The draw ht = Surrender is an
irreversible action, thus ht = Surrender =) h¿ = Surrender;¿ > t: As an addi-
tional assumption, we postulate that Follower will be forced to surrender at last
when the total operating losses exceed the equity, h¿ = Surrender if -
P
t<¿
v (qt) > u.
Summarize the actions in period t as Ht = (Ht;htjFight;htjTruce;htjMonopoly):
The competition is characterized in Proposition 1 below, which uses simple re-
sults for in￿nitely repeated games (e.g., Fudenberg, Levin and Maskin, 1986) and
backward induction.
Proposition 1. Given a discount factor – < 1, ﬁ ¡ p2 ‚ 0 and p2 ¡ c ‚ 0; the
price-war game (IOF) has two unique perfect equilibria
a) Ht = (Truce;Followj¡) 8t
b) H1 = (Fight;SurrenderjFight;FollowjTruce;FollowjMonopoly) and Ht =
(Monopoly;Surrenderj¡);t > 1:
Proof. The payo⁄ (ƒ;…) for the ￿rms of strategy (a) is (ƒ⁄;…⁄): A deviation for
Leader to ￿ght is dominated for all cases unless it leads to a surrender by Follower,




: Due to discounting, an earlier price-war
dominates a later and there can never be optimal to insert periods of Truce or
Monopoly into the price-war. The payo⁄s for the war ending with surrender at































If ƒ(b ¿) < ƒ⁄ the threat of the follower not surrendering is credible and Ht =
(Truce;Followj¡) dominates all other strategies.
If …(b ¿) ‚ …⁄ the threat of the follower is not credible and using backward induc-
tion from the time ¿ of surrender leads to a minimization of losses for ¿ = 1. The
signal H1 = Fight is the proof to Follower that Leader will continue to wage war
until it is won and that resistance is futile. Any other ￿rst-period signal by Leader
would prolong the war and is thus dominated. Given that Follower surrenders in
the ￿rst period, Monopoly dominates Truce and Fight for all proceeding periods.
Hence,H1 = (Fight;SurrenderjFight;FollowjTruce;FollowjMonopoly) and Ht =
(Monopoly;Surrenderj¡);t > 1 dominate all other strategies for ƒ(b ¿) ‚ ƒ⁄: ⁄
In fact, a constructive result about the minimum price of independence for the
smaller entity may be derived, as in the Corollary below.COOPERATIVE SUPPLY CHAINS IN PEACE AND AT WAR 7
Corollary 1. Given a discount factor – < 1; the minimum ratio of equity to ￿xed
costs, b ¿ = u

































Proof. Follows directly from the Proposition 1 and (3.2) in its proof. The minimum
ratio is de￿ned from ƒ(b ¿) = ƒ⁄: ⁄
4. The Cooperative Duopoly Model
The scenario above is revisited with the ￿rms Follower and Leader acting as
producer cooperatives. As above, cooperative Follower with n identical supplier-
members acts as Stackelberg follower in the captive market. Cooperative Leader
with m > n identical supplier-members acts as Stackelberg leader in the captive
market and has access to the competitive market. The cost functions are identical to
those de￿ned for the investor-owned ￿rm and the cooperative behavior is modelled
as in Albaek and Schultz (1998). The objective function of the cooperative is thus
to maximize the welfare of its members and the production decision rests with the
individual primary producer, i.e., with q¡i denoting the output of all producers-
members of Follower but i and Q1 the total output of cooperative Leader in the
duopoly market,


















= ﬁ ¡c ¡ﬂQ1 ¡ (ﬂ (n +1) +w)qi ¡
K (n ¡ 1)
n2qi
= 0
Dropping the index i, denote the resulting reaction function q⁄ (Q1), which is
given exactly below.
The output of cooperative Leader is determined through a two-level process, with
the suppliers acting with production quantities Qi upon a managerial choice of the
proportion of the processed output to be delivered to the captive market, s 2 [0;1].
The individual supplier of Leader faces the objective function (4.1) below, denoting
the other Leader members￿ total production by Q¡i and the total production by
cooperative Follower as q⁄ (Q),
Vi (Qi;q;s) = p((Q¡i + Qi)s + nq(Q¡i + Qi))sQi
+p2 (1 ¡ s)Qi ¡
C (Q¡i + Qi)Qi
Q¡i + Qi
¡ f (Qi) (4.1)8 PER J. AGRELL AND KOSTAS KARANTININIS
The corresponding necessary conditions give after the simpli￿cation Q¡i =
(m ¡1)Qi and the reaction function for q = q⁄ (msQi)
(4.2) ﬁs¡ﬂnq⁄ (msQi)+p2 (1 ¡s)¡c ¡
¡






a quadratic equation that with the maximum root Q⁄
i (s): The chain coordinator
at Leader subsequently4 selects the s⁄ that maximizes Vi (Qi;s), i.e.,
s⁄ = argmaxVi (Q⁄
i (s);q⁄ (msQi);s)
Thus, under the Stackelberg duopoly the two cooperatives enjoy total operating
pro￿ts V ⁄ = mVi (Q⁄
i (s⁄);nq⁄ (ms⁄Q⁄
i (s⁄));s⁄) and v⁄ = nvi(q⁄ (ms⁄Q⁄
i (s⁄))),
respectively. There is no closed form expression for the cooperative production
plan, which has to solved numerically.
4.1. The Cooperative Monopoly Model. After a successful and costless merger,
the resulting monopoly cooperative has N identical members-suppliers. The mem-
ber￿s welfare function (4.1), solved for the case Vi(Qi;0;s), is used to obtain the
reaction function Q⁄⁄
i (s) under monopoly. The monopolist cooperative may re-
port a producer gain of V ⁄⁄ = NVi(Q⁄⁄
i (s⁄⁄);0;s⁄⁄), where s⁄⁄ is obtained from
s⁄⁄ = argmaxVi (Q⁄⁄
i (s);s): The corresponding discounted value is ƒ⁄⁄from (??).
The outcome of model (4.1) is illustrated in Figure 1 below. Note that the lack
of explicit managerial control in the cooperative case causes some discontinuity in
the reaction functions. In a manner of speaking, the management of Leader plays
a two level game: an internal towards its suppliers using the market proportion
variable s, and an external versus the Follower chain, using the aggregate supply
Q1 (s):
5. The Price-War Model for Cooperatives
We will now revisit the dynamic price-war model previously presented for pro￿t-
maximizing investor-owned ￿rms.
Here, the management of Leader has no possibility of directly approaching the
suppliers of Follower, who cannot individually decide upon a merger5. Neither is
the management of Follower interested in a merger, in absence of compensation
schemes that would o⁄set the loss of managerial utility. Additional reasons for
an aversion towards merger may be envisaged from the self-selected democratic
organizational structure. Perhaps Follower has a di⁄erent business strategy than
Leader, based on e.g. organic production. In such case, the (fewer) members of
the alternative cooperative Follower may risk to be overrun by the majority of the
new structure. Note that in absence of a diverging managerial cultures or beliefs,
the individual suppliers would join a single cooperative to realize maximal gains.
4The result Q⁄;s⁄ is in this case identical to a simultaneous optimization over Q and s. How-
ever, the presentation expressively allows for alternative control strategies.
5The case where individual members may exit Follower and join Leader is excluded, for instance
due to exit grace periods, geographical separation and diseconomies of double investments.COOPERATIVE SUPPLY CHAINS IN PEACE AND AT WAR 9









q_coop( ) Q1( ) s
s
Figure 1. Cooperative Leader￿s member reaction functions,
Q1 (s) and Q2 (s), and cooperative Follower￿s reaction function
q⁄ (Q1 (s))as a function of the duopoly proportion s.
The mere existence of several producer cooperatives on a market suggests such
di⁄erences and actualizes the current model.
The maximal aggression by Leader has the intention to completely stall the
production by Follower, who subsequently is forced to pay the ￿xed cost K until
the con￿ict is resolved. However, due to the cooperative regime, this quantity
is lower and thus less costly than for the investor-owned case. The explanation,
which is formulated as a Proposition below, is that the individual supplier to the
cooperative takes the sunk cost into account and seizes production earlier than in
the IOF case. The condition is depicted in Figure 1.
Proposition 2. A cooperative Stackelberg follower stalls production earlier than
an investor-owned follower.
Proof. Following (3.1), the investor-owned follower continues production until the





The exact reaction function for the Follower cooperative under duopoly is given
by the roots of
¡(ﬂ (n + 1) ¡w)q2 + (ﬁ ¡c ¡ﬂQ1)q ¡
K (n ¡ 1)
n2 = 010 PER J. AGRELL AND KOSTAS KARANTININIS
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Figure 2. Follower￿s reaction functions qcoop(Q) and qiof (Q),
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ﬁ ¡c ¡ ﬂQ1




n2 (ﬂ (n +1) ¡w)
The reaction function lacks real valued roots when the expression under the root
sign in q⁄ (Q1) is negative,
0 > n2 (ﬁ ¡c ¡ﬂQ1)
















K (n ¡1)(ﬂ (n + 1) ¡w)














Thus, the dynamic game between the two cooperative chains has somewhat
di⁄erent properties, more generous towards the aggressor. The missing second link
of the optimal aggression (QWC
1 ;QWC
2 ) is found from the ￿rst order conditions for
the Leader. First, the aggression policy is derived for the investor-owned ￿rm.COOPERATIVE SUPPLY CHAINS IN PEACE AND AT WAR 11
Proposition 3. The least cost aggressor policy by an investor-owned Leader is














(p2 ¡ c) ¡QWC
1
where " is a small positive scalar and the expression under the root sign is
assumed non-negative.
Proof. For the aggression must hold QWC
1 > Q⁄
1 or else there is no opponent, thus
QWC
1 is imposed and Q2 optimized. The policy follows directly from Proposition 2
and the ￿rst order condition (2.6). ⁄
The cooperative leader faces a somewhat more complex problem, as he cannot
a priori impose QWC
1 (or any quantity) but has to ￿nd the control variable s to
implicitly accomplish the result. We state the result as a proposition without
repeating the proof.












K (n ¡ 1)(ﬂ(n + 1) ¡ w) +"
￿
QWC




2 = Q⁄ ¡
sW¢¡
1 ¡ sW¢
where Q⁄ (s)is from (8), " is a small positive scalar and the expression under
the root sign is assumed non-negative.
Let game (COOP) be analogous to game (IOF), but with cooperative players
That is, in each period t, chain Leader decides upon an action Ht =fFight;Truce;Monopolyg,
reveals it to Follower who responds with an action ht = fFollow;Surrenderg.
Proposition 5. Given a discount factor – < 1, ﬁ ¡ p2 ‚ 0 and p2 ¡ c ‚ 0; game
(coop) has two unique perfect equilibria
a) Ht = (Truce;Followj¡) 8t
b) H1 = (Fight;SurrenderjFight;FollowjTruce;FollowjMonopoly) and Ht =
(Monopoly;Surrenderj¡);t > 1:






during the period of con￿ict. ⁄
The interesting ￿nding is that the cooperative aggressor, earning less during
duopoly and monopoly than its investor-owned counterpart due to the decentralized
decision making, is less penalized during con￿ict. For the Example 1, presented in
Table 1 below, the cooperative Leader is severely handicapped by the presence
of the Follower cooperative. Due to a similar member behavior as in Figure 2,
the Leader is prohibited to exploit fully the duopoly market. The pro￿tability,
measured as operating surplus per delivered quantity, is higher for the Follower than
for the Leader. Thus, there is no unambiguous signal of managerial competence
to be sent by the Leader to the members of the Follower. However, Proposition
5 in combination with 3 restates that the Leader has strong coercive powers at12 PER J. AGRELL AND KOSTAS KARANTININIS








V( ) , , 300 3200 q_iof( ) 300
V( ) , , Q1 3200 q_iof( ) Q1
V( ) , , 0 4432 q_coop( ) 0
V( ) , , Q1 4432 q_coop( ) Q1
v( ) , q_iof( ) Q1 Q1
v( ) , q_coop( ) Q1 Q1
Q1
Figure 3. Operating pro￿ts V (Q1;Q2;q⁄ (Q1)) and
v (q⁄ (Q1);Q1) under the IOF and COOP regimes, as a function
of the Leader￿s duopoly quantity Q1. Parameters as in Example 1.
his disposal. In the example in Table 1, the cooperative Follower needs to have
more than three times higher equity to discourage aggression. Furthermore, as
opposed to the situation in the price-war between the investor-owned ￿rms, the
Leader su⁄ers no net loss during the con￿ict. This latter condition is of importance
for the cooperative suppliers participation constraint.
The graphs of operating pro￿t depicted in Figure 3 may shed some light on the
mystery. Notice especially the discontinuity of the cooperative Leader￿s pro￿t func-
tion for the point of seized production, QWC
1 :The cooperative aggressor theorem
summarizes the chapter, stating some of the model￿s support for the cooperative
regime as a reason for a more aggressive behavior.
Theorem 1. In a Stackelberg duopoly and a leader-exclusive competitive fringe,
aggression between investor-owned ￿rms is always less pro￿table (for some discount
factor – < 1) than aggression between cooperative ￿rms.
We sketch an idea to a proof: The pro￿tability of a threat of aggression is given
by ¡(¿) = ƒ(¿) ¡ ƒ⁄: Denote the cooperative entities with a C and the investor-
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Since the reaction function of the cooperative cannot improve pro￿t, V ⁄
C • V ⁄
I .
Proposition 2 yields that QWC
1 < QW












, since the cooperative Leader always will show a positive pro￿t on
each market. Finally the di⁄erence in monopoly pro￿t. We know from Appendix 9.3
that V ⁄⁄
C • V ⁄⁄




4ﬂ holds. By adjusting the discount factor –
¿ accordingly, the value of
these monopoly gains will be reduced and the conjecture will hold.
Example 1. Compare two cooperative and investor-owned ￿rms playing the Stack-
elberg game with parameter values: m = 100; n = 50;ﬁ = 100;ﬂ = 0:05;c = 10;w =
1;p2 = 45;K = 200;– = 0:95: The results are given in Table 1, where it is noted
that the cost of aggression is considerably lower for the cooperative Leader than for
the investor-owned and that the di⁄erence in monopoly gain is rather limited.









































b ¿ 9.85 19.9
6. Incentive Structure and Information Disclosure
Albeit less harmful than IOF aggression, the results above do not suggest that
cooperatives price wars would be part of the equilibrium path. Under complete
information, the suppliers of the less viable cooperative chain would immediately
enroll in the cooperative leader chain to share the fruits of coordination. Analo-
gously, in the presence of actual di⁄erences in e¢ciency among the cooperatives,
the members would instantaneously abandon the ine¢cient incumbent in favour of
the entrant. Thus, at a quick theoretical glance, there seems to be limited interest
in the pre-merger, merger and entry conditions under cooperative governance.
However, several institutional particularities of cooperative governance prompt
for further analysis in this respect.
First, the complete information assumption is likely to be invalid under cooper-
ative governance for several reasons. The mere fact that the supplier-members (of
this stylized cooperative) have no residual claim rights nor delivery obligations may
limit their involvement in its a⁄airs. Adopting a myopic perspective, the individual
supplier who receives a higher revenue from a fringe cooperative chain is not likely14 PER J. AGRELL AND KOSTAS KARANTININIS
to abandon the structure until the aggressor has signalled that it is committed to
liquidate it. Since there is neglible equity at stake, the equilibrium strategy of the
member is to switch only when the expected pro￿tability drops below competing
o⁄ers.
Second, the management compensation mechanism in a cooperative chain may
contribute to the e⁄ect above. In the absence of residual claim rights and associated
derivative instruments (options, futures, convertibles), the compensation schemes
are historically limited to ￿xed reimbursements U = K0 and volume-based com-
missions U = K0 + K1qfor the coordinator. In combination with a potentially
incomplete market for executives in cooperatives (few agents, particular quali￿-
cations), the risks attributed by the governance principle itself would have been
compensated with a ￿golden parachute￿-type contract in a comparable industry.
Without adequate alternative exit compensation, the management of the coopera-
tive fringe ￿rm has disincentives in communicating merger gains. In practice, the
sizable managerial compensations for comparable enterprises would likely be sub-
ject to member criticism when applied to a cooperative. The cooperative leader,
who cannot credibly commit to sharing the expected pro￿ts with the seeding man-
agement team, is left to other means.
The dominant may try to communicate the future bene￿ts directly to members,
bypassing the management in their ￿golden cage￿. However, albeit theoretically
su¢cient, the individual fringe members enjoying higher pro￿t margins may ￿nd
ex ante predictions of future gains to be less convincing than the past performance
of their current organization.
Hence, there is an inherent managerial compensation problem in the coopera-
tive governance that may actualize aggressive pre-merger behavior. As opposed
to the IOF case, where both management and owners of the acquired ￿rm have
private rationality reasons to accept a smooth merger, the cooperative merger may
potentially involve a costly pre-merger aggression. This operation, that is further
facilitated by the results showing the feasibility of the dominant to wage a rela-
tively long con￿ict, serves to lower the reservation wages for the management and
to signal de￿nite take-over to the membership. The fringe members, while noticing
the price war, may deviate to the dominant under the belief that the aggression is
only launched if the dominant has su¢cient resources to win it.
7. Cooperative Merger, Aggression and Resolution in Scandinavia
Based in Denmark, MD Foods, the largest cooperative dairy chain in Europe
in 2000, has 9 500 producers, over 13 500 employees, a turnover of 23 Gkr and
an annual output of 4.9 Gkg raw milk. Since late 2000, when a merger with the
largest dairy cooperative in Sweden, Arla, became e⁄ective, the dairy giant Arla
Foods will have a raw milk volume of 7.0 Gkg and 17 900 employees in 23 countries.
The history of this cooperative Goliath provides an excellent illustration to the
mathematical model. Further analysis on the actual merger scenario is found in
Agrell and Karantininis (1999)
During 1992-1999, MD Foods has fought at least two major price-wars on the
Danish market, culminating with the turbulent acquisition of the only other Dan-
ish producer, Kloever maelk, in March 1999 when monopoly power ￿nally was
obtained. Up until the ￿nal battle, the four times larger MD Foods had unsuccess-
fully attempted to persuade the members of the smaller, but more pro￿table, dairy.COOPERATIVE SUPPLY CHAINS IN PEACE AND AT WAR 15
In fact, the Kloever maelk membership increased in 1997/98. During the actual
con￿ict in 1999, the aggressor stood stronger due to a settlement after a previous
price-war in 1992, where the two cooperatives agreed upon a common production
structure and a common export organization, dominated by MD Foods. Three
smaller dairies, Enigheden6, Landmandslyst7, and Randers & Viborg8 were
acquired and subsequently closed down during the period.
The subsequent merger between MD Foods and Arlain 2000 was conducted
peacefully. One may speculate whether the fact that the cooperatives were fairly
large, operating in separate (geographical) markets and had complementary in-
terests contributed to the convergence. Another reason may also be the relative
balance of power: MD Foodshas an equity/assets ratio of 24% in 19989, compared
to 42% for its Swedish neighbor Arla10.
8. Conclusion
The results of the Stackelberg model suggests that cooperative supply chains are
not more aggressive in general, being hampered from waging even short-term con-
￿icts below cost. Rather, it turns out that niche cooperative chains are weaker than
their investor-owned counterparts due to high decentralization towards its suppli-
ers. Thus, the explanation to the observed tendency in cooperative dairy industry
may be that oligopolistic cooperative markets are inherently instable. Unable to
make smooth transfer of equity rights and su⁄ering from managerial merger disin-
centives due to the organizational form, the cooperative ￿rms are limited to force
(close to) market exit to induce a mutually bene￿cial merger.
From a policy and mechanism design viewpoint, the results prompt for a careful
review of the managerial compensation packages in large and small cooperative
organizations. The lower commitment from the members in combination with a
potentially curbed managerial compensation package is not without implications
for the long-term development of the ￿rm.
From a theoretical side, the paper shows that the strength of the investor-owned
follower in the Stackelberg model with a fringe does not have a correspondence in
the cooperative setting. It also extends the literature on cooperative economics
with the discontinuous supply curve and equilibria for monopoly and duopoly with
a competitive fringe.
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6Aquired in March 1995 under a settlement of continued operation until 1998, closed prema-
turely in Jan 1996.
7Aquired and closed in 1995 after having been launched as the only national competitior to
the two market dominants.
8Five dairies with an annual raw milk volume of 135 Mkg, aquired in 1996 after a bidding
contest and immediately closed .
9Annual report 1997/98
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9. Appendix
9.1. Appendix. The exact pro￿t expressions for the IOF duopoly game are given
as






































2 and q⁄ are given in equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), respectively.
9.2. Appendix. The necessary optimality conditions for the Leader cooperative
chain are given by
@V (Q;s)
@Qi
= (ﬁ ¡ﬂ (sQ¡i + sQi + q







Qis+ p2 (1 ¡ s) ¡c ¡
KQ¡i
(Q¡i +Qi)
2 ¡ wQi = 0
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Using the identity property of the primary producers, Q¡i = (m ¡ 1)Qi, Q =
mQi and rearranging the terms obtains a quadratic expression,































which may be somewhat simpli￿ed to
Q2

















and numerically solved, using thetwo derivatives as Q⁄ (s) = mQi(s;q⁄ (msQi)).
9.3. Appendix. Part of the proof of Theorem where the deviation for a coopera-
tive producer under monopoly is studied.
Recall the necessary conditions from Appendix 9.2 for the cooperative Leader
under monopoly market structure.
ﬁs ¡ﬂs
2 (N + 1)Qi + p2 (1 ¡ s) ¡c ¡
K (N ¡ 1)
N2Qi
¡wQi = 0 (9.1)
[ﬁ ¡2ﬂsNQi ¡p2]Qi = 0 (9.2)










































However cumbersome this may seem, it follows from (9.2) that
Q⁄⁄
1 = Q⁄⁄s⁄⁄ = NQis⁄⁄ =
(ﬁ ¡ p2)
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which is identical to the investor-owned correspondence (2.9). For comparison,
study the IOF monopoly problem with the decision variables (Q;s) such that Q1 =
Qs and Q2 = Q(1 ¡ s), i.e., the objective function






with necessary optimality conditions
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Thus, by letting N = 1 we may verify the correctness and the sign of the dif-
ference in monopoly pro￿t by substituting Qi =
p2¡c
































































4ﬂ then there is no pro￿t di⁄erence due to coordination regime.
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